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Markets, Privatisation and Law and Order – Some economic 
considerations 
Kevin Albertson discusses the difficulty of aligning private incentives with the public 
good. 
In the following, we discuss the social efficiency of delivering criminal justice from the point 
of view of the neo-liberal economic paradigm. We do not seek either to critique or support 
the basic principles of neo-liberalism; rather, we consider, if we chose to accept the neo-
liberal discourse, how might the provision of criminal justice be carried out most effectively 
and in line with social wellbeing. 
Neo-liberalism has many meanings, but here we adopt common usage as a description of a 
body of theory which, in accordance with Friedman (1962), suggests governments adopt 
policies broadly promoting a circumscribed role for the state and economic and social 
policies informed/determined by the operation of individual incentive structures in 
(supposedly) free-markets. 
The theory of markets 
The roles of individuals and corporations 
The neo-liberal paradigm is based on the principles of individuals’ pursuit of self-interest and 
the corporate sector’s maximisation of shareholder returns (Friedman 1962: 113). It is 
suggested such self-interest, coordinated through the market, will lead to efficiency – the best 
possible outcome for a given unit of resource.  
The reason why markets are, in theory, efficient is that, where good value for consumers’ 
money is supplied, the supplier may expect payment and repeat trade. Conversely, if the 
consumer fails to receive that for which they are prepared to pay, they will either not pay or 
will change suppliers. Similarly, the asking price serves to align customers’ expectations with 
production costs. Therefore, in order to compete, suppliers produce that which the consumer 
requires at a reasonable price. In this sense, free-markets provide an evolutionary process, 
moulding trade through millions of individual choices to motivate consumers and suppliers to 
engage in efficient exchange (Beinhocker 2006). 
The power of a market economy is illustrated by Paul Seabright in recounting  the perplexity 
of a former communist Russian official who asked “who is in charge of the supply of bread to 
the population of London?” Seabright (2004: 10). In a market economy, according to 
Seabright, “nobody is in charge”. Leaving it to individuals to decide what is in their own 
interest is more efficient than trying to work out, centrally, what it is those millions desire. 
The roles of the state 
There is, however, a curious paradox in market-based systems. Although markets are a more 
efficient means of coordinating human activity in the provision of goods and services than a 
centrally planned economy, without regulation, markets are liable to provide goods and 
services inefficiently from a social point of view. If Seabright’s official had asked, “who is in 
charge of the purity of the bread in London?”, or, for that matter, “who is in charge of 
ensuring that beef lasagne in London contains only beef?”, perhaps the answer might not 
have been “nobody”.  
For markets to work efficiently at a social level, there must be full information on costs and 
outcomes, and rapid and direct feedback from consumers to suppliers.  While it is generally 
the case that, for example, consumers can tell a good loaf of bread from a poor loaf, it is 
clearly more difficult to tell beef from horse in a processed meat product. Where the level of 
information and feedback is poor, suppliers’ profits may be enhanced by deceiving the 
consumer. The less information is available to the consumer and the fewer the opportunities 
for feedback, the greater is the potential for market inefficiency. 
The neo-liberal policy prescription in such a situation is for citizens is to utilise the power of 
the state to create an incentive structure so that the pursuit of individual and corporate profit 
will lead to maximised social wellbeing (Friedman 1962: 112). Thus, neo-liberal state exists 
“to preserve law and order, to enforce private contracts, to foster competitive markets” (ibid.: 
11). A further role of government is to pursue social goals as “government may enable us at 
times to accomplish jointly what we would find it more difficult or expensive to accomplish 
severally” (ibid.). 
In short, an individual’s pursuit of self-interest will not necessarily lead to maximised social 
prosperity unless the “invisible hand” of the market is constrained by the rest of us through 
the state (c.f. Friedman 1962: 31). 
The provision of law and order 
Social efficiency 
While it is the state’s responsibility to provide law and order, neo-liberalism does not 
prescribe whether such provision should be directly by publically owned enterprises or 
through contracted agents. However, when considering such contracting, the question of the 
relative efficiency of the private and public sectors must be framed in such a way which 
reflects overall social benefit. For instance, historically it has been the case that a decline in 
employment and/or wages is observed in publicly-owned industries after privatisation 
(Haskel and Szymanski 1993). Whether or not this reflects an increase in efficiency may 
depend on the metric employed. The public decision maker has a responsibility to consider 
the level of direct costs and services delivered, but must also take into account external 
effects, such as the impact of direct cost savings on unemployment and the impact on taxes 
and benefits, on society as whole. 
Targets 
Whether law and order is provided directly by the state, or whether it is contracted out, its 
efficient provision relies on market principles. The ultimate customer is society; the supplier 
is either government or its contracted agent. In practice, it is not straightforward for citizens 
to determine whether the required amount of criminal justice has been delivered. Justice is 
not easily quantified and statistics are notoriously difficult to interpret, even where they are 
accurate. Society may therefore come to rely on rather blunt indicators, for example a 
reduction in proven reoffending. This motivates the whole concept of Payment by Results 
(Fox and Albertson 2011), where society empowers the state efficiently to deliver 
performance targets as proxies for criminal justice. 
However, the adoption of targets as a substitute for effectively operating markets has been 
shown to lead to inefficiency and “corruption pressures” (Campbell 1976: 34). The market 
will deliver the most efficient way of hitting any target, whether or not this target accurately 
reflects the matter of interest to the customer (ibid.). Ultimately, it is perceptions of safety 
and levels of crime which society seeks to address through criminal justice – such qualitative 
policy goals may prove difficult, if not impossible, to reflect in a simple quantitative measure. 
Any indicator which becomes a target can not then be used as an indicator.  
Localism 
Empowering local government through devolution of state power is a second general thrust 
of neo-liberal policy (Friedman 1962:11). In whatever they ask of the state, the feedback 
process from consumers to government will theoretically be more effective at the local level. 
Citizens are generally more knowledgeable about their locale than about the nation as a 
whole; local preferences may differ from those of the nation; and there is a greater chance 
voters will have more experience in judging competence and performance of a local elected 
politician compared to a centrally designated minister.  
In the UK, we have recently elected Police and Crime Commissioners, PCCs, responsible at 
local level for law and order provision. By construction, voting for a PCC is informed by 
voters’ local perspectives on crime, whereas voting patterns in national elections will be 
informed by a variety of issues. Therefore, neo-liberal theory suggests, if PPCs were given 
the power to contract for criminal justice, their focussed mandate should facilitate customer 
feedback and increase the efficiency of provision.  
Transparency 
To maximise the information content of criminal justice expenditure and provision – further 
to facilitate informed voter behaviour, and therefore increase efficiency – all criminal justice 
expenditure and associated statistics and interpretation ought to be publically and clearly 
available. If the market is to work effectively, the customer must be able to determine 
whether they have received the service for which they have paid. Similarly, to minimise the 
potential for distortion of criminal justice targets, society might monitor criminal justice 
provision through the establishment of a means of bringing any such distortions to the 
attention of the public at large. 
In sum 
Free-markets are by no means adequate to align reasonable social goals, such as the provision 
of criminal justice services, with the pursuit of corporate profits. Moreover, socio-political 
and regulatory mechanisms by which the two might be aligned are by no means 
straightforward. In general, we suggest neo-liberal theory indicates criminal justice contracts 
are most likely to be aligned with community aspirations where: 
1. The social benefits of public provision are accurately compared to the social benefits 
of private sector provision; 
2. Contracts are negotiated and delivered at the local level by community 
representatives, democratically elected, with direct local accountability; 
3. So far as possible, contracts reflect holistic social goals, rather than simplistic targets; 
4. Contracts are clear and transparent, and the terms and conditions are freely available 
so citizens can provide feedback through democratic processes; 
5. Facilities are made available, informally and formally, for the performance of elected 
representatives and criminal justice contractors’ performance to be monitored by 
citizens in real-time time. 
Ultimately, it must be borne in mind, markets work best when they are: simple; open; and 
amenable to effective regulation.  
Kevin Albertson is a Reader in Economics at Manchester Metropolitan University. 
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